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As a basic feature of accounting reporting, the main role of accounting conservatism is to promote the sign-
ing of debt contracts by preventing an enterprise from over-reporting its assets and thus damaging the interests
of creditors (Watts, 2003; Jiang and Zhang, 2007). The creditors of an enterprise are mainly banks and trading
partners (i.e. suppliers and customers), so two types of debt contracts exist: bank credit contracts and trade
credit contracts.by the
Talents
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Jiang, 2011; Zhu, 2011; Cheng and Liu, 2013), with less attention being paid to trade credit (Hui et al.,
2012). However, trade credit is widely used in both developed and developing countries. In the UK, for
example, trade credit accounts for 70% of short-term debt and 55% of credit loans (Kohler et al., 2000).
Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that on average, trade credit accounted for 17.8% of the total assets of Amer-
ican companies in 1991, and for over 25% of those of their German, Italian and French counterparts.
Although China’s ﬁnancial system is not sound, trade credit plays a decisive role in its national economy.
Focusing on accounting conservatism and changes in monetary policy, we investigate how these two ele-
ments aﬀect trade credit and discuss the diﬀerent eﬀects of accounting conservatism on trade credit for trading
parties with diﬀerent backgrounds.
Speciﬁcally, we aim to answer the following questions. First, do accounting conservatism policies aﬀect
trade credit ﬁnancing? The literature on trade credit is currently based mainly on the theories of alternative
ﬁnancing and market power. From the perspective of demand, the theory of alternative ﬁnancing holds that
credit rationing prevents some companies from obtaining suﬃcient bank lending. They therefore turn to trade
credit ﬁnancing, despite having to bear the higher costs of trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Biais and
Gollier, 1997). From the supply perspective, market power theory considers that due to market power, sup-
pliers (customers) will take the initiative to provide a large amount of low-cost trade credit to a company to
promote sales (supplies) (Summers and Wilson, 1999; Fisman and Raturi, 2004; Van Horen, 2005). Regardless
of what theory applies, a company seeking trade credit needs to sign a debt contract with a supplier or a cus-
tomer. Hui et al. (2012) argue that as accounting conservatism can recognize losses in a timely fashion, it can
protect the interests of customers and suppliers when signing contracts and reduce potential losses from such
transactions. We therefore examine whether companies with higher accounting conservatism obtain more
trade credit.
Second, how does accounting conservatism inﬂuence trade credit when monetary policy changes? In a per-
iod of tight monetary policy, the problem of credit discrimination, or credit rationing, becomes worse and it
becomes harder for companies to obtain bank loans. Meanwhile, suppliers or customers become more cau-
tious about providing trade credit because of increasing uncertainty in the economic environment. We there-
fore investigate whether accounting conservatism has a greater eﬀect on obtaining trade credit when the
demand for trade credit increases and the supply reduces. Third, does accounting conservatism have diﬀerent
eﬀects on trade credit for trading parties with diﬀerent backgrounds? Previous studies ﬁnd that enterprises
with diﬀerent levels of market power and diﬀerent types of ownership obtain trade credit diﬀerently (Lu
and Yang, 2011; Zhang et al., 2012), and that the contractual relationship in transactions between related par-
ties can aﬀect the choice of trade credit mode (Liu et al., 2009). We therefore investigate whether the diﬀerent
backgrounds of companies and their suppliers or customers aﬀect the relationship between accounting conser-
vatism and trade credit.
To test these research questions, we use data for Chinese listed companies during 2003–2012. First, we ﬁnd
that companies with higher accounting conservatism obtain more trade credit. Second, accounting conser-
vatism has a greater eﬀect on trade credit under tight monetary policy. Third, the positive relationship between
accounting conservatism and trade credit is related to the backgrounds of the supplier and the customer. The
inﬂuence on this positive relationship is most marked when a company is privately owned and has greater
market power, and less evident when a supplier or customer is the controlling shareholder.
The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, previous research on trade credit focuses on the
motives for trade credit, but we explore the operational mechanism of accounting conservatism, a factor in
obtaining trade credit, from the perspective of debt contracting. Second, with respect to monetary policy,
we investigate the eﬀect of accounting conservatism on trade credit under diﬀerent monetary policies, which
enriches the literature on macro-economic policy and micro-enterprise behavior. Finally, taking the diﬀerent
backgrounds of the parties into account, we discuss the joint eﬀect of corporate characteristics, associated rela-
tionships and accounting conservatism in the contracting process, which expands the research on trade credit.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section brieﬂy outlines the previous research with
respect to trade credit and accounting conservatism, and outlines our research hypotheses; the third section
explains the process of sample selection and the establishment of the model; the fourth section presents the
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to the diﬀerent backgrounds of trading parties; and the sixth section provides the conclusions.
2. Literature review and research hypotheses
2.1. Accounting conservatism and trade credit
Accounting earnings information plays an important role in the process of signing contracts between enter-
prises and suppliers or customers. According to Williamson (1979), transactions can be divided into discrete
transactions, long-term transactions and relational transactions. A discrete transaction involves a one-time
contract, and the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract can be clearly deﬁned. In a long-term
transaction the contract is long-term and incomplete, and cannot cover all future uncertainties. In a relational
transaction the contract is also long-term and involves special investment. From the perspective of reducing
transaction costs, transactions between enterprises and suppliers or customers are usually long-term or rela-
tional transactions. Due to the incompleteness of long-term contracts, ﬁrms are more likely to adopt oppor-
tunistic behavior. In particular, in relational transactions in which the suppliers and customers often require
special asset investment, if the company cancels the transaction because of ﬁnancial diﬃculties or other rea-
sons, the suppliers and customers will incur high switching costs (Hui et al., 2012). Suppliers and customers are
able to observe very recent changes in the operating conditions of a company through their business dealings,
so have information advantages over banks and other credit institutions (Lu and Yang, 2011). However, with
respect to opportunity costs and sunk costs in long-term transactions, suppliers and customers still consider a
company’s overall proﬁtability when judging the prospects for long-term cooperation with that enterprise and
when deciding whether or not to trade with a particular company or what type of transaction to provide to
that company.
As suppliers and customers, unlike shareholders, are the main creditors in trade credit transactions, their
proﬁt function is asymmetric. That is, they bear the risk of enterprise bankruptcy but do not gain any appre-
ciation in the value of assets, which leads them to pay greater attention to bad news regarding a company’s
performance than to good news. Meanwhile, company managers have an information advantage over other
stakeholders and tend to hide any bad news for reasons of self-interest. The interests of suppliers and cus-
tomers will thus be damaged through information asymmetry when managers report relatively little relating
to bad news for a company.
How, then, can the interests of suppliers and customers be protected in a transaction? Hui et al. (2012) con-
ﬁrm that accounting conservatism is one feasible mechanism for providing such protection. The conservatism
principle stipulates that an enterprise cannot recognize a potential beneﬁt, but should recognize a potential
loss in a timely fashion (Basu, 1997). Accordingly, the interests of suppliers and customers can be protected
through the following two mechanisms.
First, by inhibiting excessive investment and insuﬃcient investment, accounting conservatism can improve
the future proﬁtability of a company, ensuring long-term cooperation with its suppliers and customers.
Accounting conservatism results in investment losses being reﬂected in management reporting as soon as pos-
sible, so that shareholders receive timely signals that the net present value of an investment project is negative,
which inhibits excessive investment (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). At the same time, accounting conservatism
can help to alleviate underinvestment by reducing the ﬁnancing costs of the enterprise (Garcia Lara et al.,
2011). As a result, the higher the accounting conservatism of a company, the higher the company’s future prof-
itability, and the lower the possibility of future special project expenditure (Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). A
higher proﬁtability for a company can ensure sustainable cooperation relationships with suppliers and cus-
tomers, who are then willing to provide more trade credit to that company based on the expectation of future
long-term cooperation.
Second, accounting conservatism can help suppliers and customers to promptly identify poor performance
by a company. Taking loan contracts as the object of study, Zhang (2008) concludes that higher accounting
conservatism makes it easier for companies to violate restrictive clauses in debt contracts, and helps creditors
to promptly enforce or re-sign contracts. Therefore, the higher the accounting conservatism, the lower the loan
interest rate paid by the company. Similarly, accounting conservatism can also reduce information asymmetry,
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establish cooperative relations with mutual trust, such that suppliers and customers are willing to accept a
certain degree of risk and provide more trade credit. Conversely, if a company’s accounting reports are less
conservative and the interests of suppliers and customers cannot be protected, the payment terms required
by the suppliers and customers will be more stringent because they wish to protect their own interests and
safely control risk. Accordingly, they will not provide a large amount of trade credit.
Based on the above analysis, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1. Corporations with higher accounting conservatism obtain more trade credit.2.2. Monetary policy, accounting conservatism and trade credit
Monetary policy is important to governments as a means of intervening in and adjusting the macro-
economy. When monetary policy changes from loose to tight, enterprises face a diﬀerent macroeconomic envi-
ronment. The behavior of enterprises, creditors and shareholders may therefore also change (Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1994). The eﬀect of monetary policy on a micro-enterprise is ﬁrst reﬂected in changes in the infor-
mation environment. During a period of monetary tightening, the degree of future information uncertainty
that companies will face increases. Using panel data for listed companies in the UK for 1970–1990,
Beaudry et al. (2001) ﬁnd that in the 1980s, frequent changes in monetary policy led to the total variance
of investment in listed corporations being signiﬁcantly smaller than that in the 1970s. This reﬂects the char-
acteristic that enterprise investment behavior tends to be uniform when facing uncertainty due to monetary
policy.
Due to imperfections in the capital market, the problem of information asymmetry and related contract
cost is common within actual economic operations. Banks play an irreplaceable role in alleviating information
asymmetry, dispersing risk and reducing transaction costs in the credit market. Monetary policy can inﬂuence
the availability of bank credit, and accordingly aﬀect the behavior of enterprises, creditors and shareholders.
Much empirical literature provides evidence that a tight monetary policy aﬀects corporate ﬁnancing. The
literature indicates that a tight monetary policy reduces the funds available to banks to loan out, increases
the diﬃculty of obtaining loans and as a result aﬀects the investments made by enterprises (Kashyap et al.,
1993; Ye and Zhu, 2009). In addition, increasing loan interest rates raises the capital cost to the enterprise
(Mojon et al., 2002). In China, ﬁnancing channels for enterprises are relatively less common than in
other countries, and bank loans represent the main ﬁnancing channel. At the same time, banking in China
is very vulnerable to the actions and regulations of the government. As the People’s Bank of China tightens
monetary policy by raising the deposit reserve rate, the benchmark interest rate and the discount rate, the real
economy is aﬀected through the credit channel, reﬂected speciﬁcally in a signiﬁcant reduction in the amount of
corporate credit ﬁnancing (Ye and Zhu, 2009). Accordingly, under a tight monetary policy, an enterprise’s
external ﬁnancing costs increase, the scale of external ﬁnancing is limited and the problem of credit rationing
worsens.
The worsening of credit rationing makes it diﬃcult for an enterprise to obtain bank credit ﬁnancing, and it
becomes more dependent on trade credit ﬁnancing. As the demand for trade credit increases while the funds
available decrease due to the tight monetary policy, trade credit becomes a scarce resource. In such a period of
monetary tightening, suppliers and customers, as providers of trade credit, will be more concerned about
whether the assets of the enterprise can pay oﬀ debt. They will thus require a more conservative corporate
accounting policy to enable them to adjust credit policies sooner. Under this premise, relative to a period
of monetary easing, suppliers and customers in a period of monetary tightening will be more willing to provide
trade credit for enterprises with higher accounting conservatism, and trade credit will then ﬂow more inten-
sively into these enterprises.
Based on the above analysis, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2. During a period of monetary tightening, corporations with higher accounting conservatism obtain more
trade credit.
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3.1. Sample and data
Using A-share listed companies in China during 2003–2012 as the basis and after removing companies in
the ﬁnancial industry and companies with missing data, the sample comprises 12,121 ﬁrm-year observations of
1880 companies. Data on corporate governance are from the CCER database and other data are from the
CSMAR database. All observations in the top 1% and bottom 1% for continuous variables are winsorized
to control for outliers, and t-values are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
3.2. Research design
3.2.1. Trade credit (TC)
With reference to Lu and Yang (2011) and Zhang et al. (2012), the following formula is used to calculate
TC: TC = (accounts payable + notes payable + advances from customers)/total assets.
3.2.2. Accounting conservatism (C-Score)
New or improved methods have appeared regularly since Basu (1997) used the inverse regression method to
measure accounting conservatism, such as the accruals/cash-ﬂows regression method of Ball and Shivakumar
(2005), the accrual measure of Givoly and Hayn (2000), the measure of Beaver and Ryan (2000) based on the
book-to-market ratio, and the C-Score method of Khan and Watts (2009). As our analysis requires a ﬁrm-year
measure of accounting conservatism, the C-Score method is adopted. The C-Score is calculated as follows:X i;t
P i;t1
¼ b0 þ b1DRi;t þ ðl1 þ l2SIZEi;t þ l3MBi;t þ l4LEVi;tÞ RETi;t
þ ðk1 þ k2SIZEi;t þ k3MBi;t þ k4LEVi;tÞ DRi;t RETi;t þ b4SIZEi;t þ b5MBi;t þ b6LEVi;t
þ b7DRi;t  SIZEi;t þ b8DRi;t MBi;t þ b9DRi;t  LEVi;t
G-Score ¼ b2 ¼ l1 þ l2SIZEi;t þ l3MBi;t þ l4LEVi;t
C-Score ¼ b3 ¼ k1 þ k2SIZEi;t þ k3MBi;t þ k4LEVi;tX i;t
P i;t1
is ﬁrm i’s earnings per share divided by its stock price at the beginning of year t, adjusted by the annual
mean of the sample. RETi,t is the stock return of ﬁrm i minus the market return in year t (from May in year t
to April in year t + 1). DRi,t is a dummy for the stock return of ﬁrm i in year t, which equals 1 when
RETi,tP 0, and 0 otherwise. SIZEi,t is the logarithm of total assets. MBi,t is the book-to-market ratio, which
is ﬁrm i’s total market value divided by its book value for owners’ equity at the end of year t. LEVi,t is the ratio
of total liabilities to total assets.
C-Score measures the timeliness of bad news (i.e. the level of conservatism). The higher the value of
C-Score, the higher the degree of accounting conservatism.
3.2.3. Tight monetary policy (MP)
Based on the work of the Macro Group, CCER, PKU (2008), monetary liquidity can be measured on three
bases: excess money, money stock and the interest rate in the short-term lending market. The measures based on
excess money include the situation in which the money growth rate exceeds the nominal GDP growth rate (Baks
and Kramer, 1999), and that in which the money growth rate exceeds the actual GDP growth rate and the price
increase rate (Yi, 1991). The measures based on money stock include the growth rate ofM2, the diﬀerence in the
growth rates ofM1 andM2 and the ratio ofM1/M2. The measures based on the interest rate in the short-term
lending market include the one-year lending rate (Li and Wang, 2011), the bond spread and so on.
Of these measurement bases, only the ﬁrst takes money demand into account. According to a general
economic analysis, there will be excess monetary liquidity if the supply of money is greater than the demand,
and a shortage of money liquidity when the supply of money is less than the demand. Accordingly, the ﬁrst
measurement basis is adopted here.
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M2 growth rate to measure the supply of money. Thus, the diﬀerence between the nominal GDP growth rate
and the M2 growth rate reﬂects the degree of monetary liquidity shortage. If the diﬀerence is positive, this
indicates that the current money supply is insuﬃcient and a period of monetary tightening applies, and
MP = 1; if the diﬀerence is negative, this indicates that the current money supply is adequate and a period
of monetary easing applies, and MP = 0 (Li and Wang, 2011). The diﬀerences between the nominal GDP
growth rate and the M2 growth rate are 0.079, 0.033, 0.023, 0.013, 0.061, 0.004, 0.199, 0.012, 0.005
and 0.045 from 2003 to 2012. Therefore, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2011 are deﬁned as monetary tightening
periods, while the other years are deﬁned as monetary easing periods.3.2.4. Control variables
The control variables are CFO, LIQ, LOAN, AGE, SIZE, EBIT, GROWTH, MPOWER, STATE and
GOVINDEX.
For those demanding trade credit, the adequacy of internal cash ﬂows and the availability of bank loans are
important factors aﬀecting trade credit ﬁnancing, according to pecking order theory and alternative ﬁnancing
theory. Therefore, we use CFO (net cash ﬂow from operating activities/total assets) to measure an enterprise’s
ability to generate cash, LIQ (current assets/total assets) to measure the liquidity ratio and LOAN (bank
loans/total assets) to measure the proportion of bank loans to total assets.
Those supplying trade credit will take a ﬁrm’s establishment age (AGE), size (SIZE), proﬁtability (EBIT)
and growth ability (GROWTH) into account when providing trade credit.
In addition, the amount of trade credit that an enterprise obtains reﬂects its bargaining power in the indus-
try. The stronger the market position, the more trade credit may be obtained (Fisman and Raturi, 2004; Zhang
et al., 2012). MPOWER is used to measure the market position of an enterprise. If the market share of the
enterprise, that is, the ratio of the ﬁrm’s sales revenue to the industry’s sales revenue, is greater than the indus-
try median, then MPOWER equals 1, and 0 otherwise.
The existing literature shows that the amount of trade credit obtained by state-owned enterprises is signif-
icantly higher than for non-state-owned enterprises, because state-owned enterprises have good credit ratings
and no constraints on ﬁnancing (Liu et al., 2009; Lu and Yang, 2011). Thus, STATE is used to control for the
eﬀect of the nature of ﬁrm ownership, which equals 1 if a ﬁrm is state-owned, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, the eﬀect of corporate governance is also controlled for in our analysis. With reference to the
approach of Bai et al. (2005) and Zhang and Lu (2012), we use the shareholding ratio of the ﬁrst major
shareholder (TOP1), the ownership concentration from the second to the tenth shareholders (Cstr2_10),
the shareholding ratio of senior management (Mana), whether the board chairman and the CEO are the same
person (Dual), the proportion of independent directors on the board (Indratio), whether there is a listing in the
B-share or H-share market at the same time (HB_share, which equals 1 if listed at the same time, and 0
otherwise) and whether there is ownership by a parent company (Parent, which equals 1 if owned, and 0
otherwise) to construct a corporate governance index through the method of principal component analysis.1
The ﬁrst principal component obtained from the analysis is deﬁned as an indicator of corporate governance
level, GOVINDEX. Speciﬁc deﬁnitions of the variables are given in Table 1.3.3. The empirical model
To analyze whether accounting conservatism aﬀects an enterprise’s trade credit ﬁnancing behavior, and to
test the eﬀect of accounting conservatism on trade credit under diﬀerent monetary policies, we use the
following models2:1 Bai et al. (2005) also consider the nature of ﬁrm ownership when constructing a corporate governance index. Previous studies ﬁnd that
the amount of trade credit obtained by state-owned enterprises is signiﬁcantly higher than for non-state-owned enterprises, and the
direction of this inﬂuence is not consistent with the directions of the other corporate governance factors for trade credit; thus, we examine
the nature of ﬁrm ownership alone.
2 To avoid the problem of endogeneity, we use lagged C-Score values in the model to measure accounting conservatism. The results are
not aﬀected if current C-Score values are used.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Type Symbol Name Deﬁnition
Explained variable TC Trade credit (Accounts payable + notes payable + advances from customers)/
total assets
Explanatory
variable
C-Score Accounting conservatism Measured using the C-Score method (Khan and Watts, 2009)
MP Tight monetary policy If 4GDP/GDPt1 4M2/M2t1 > 0, then MP = 1; otherwise
MP = 0
Controlled variable MPOWER Market power If a company’s market share (sales revenue/entire industry sales
revenue) is greater than the industry median, MPOWER = 1.
Otherwise, MPOWER = 0
STATE Nature of ﬁrm ownership If a company is state-owned, STATE = 1. Otherwise, STATE = 0
LOAN Bank loan (Short-term loans + long-term loans)/total assets
AGE Age of the company The natural logarithm of the years since the company was
established
SIZE Scale of the company The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
CFO Cash ﬂows of operating Net cash ﬂows from operating activities/total assets
LIQ Current assets Current assets/total assets
EBIT Proﬁtability Earnings before interest and tax/total assets
GROWTH Growth rate (Operating income for the year  operating income for the
previous year)/operating income for the previous year
GOVINDEX Index of corporate
governance
The ﬁrst principal component obtained through the method of
principal component analysis using the following seven variables:
the shareholding ratio of the ﬁrst major shareholder (TOP1), the
ownership concentration from the second to the tenth
shareholders (Cstr2_10), the shareholding ratio of senior
management (Mana), whether the board chairman and the CEO
are the same person (Dual), the proportion of independent
directors on the board (Indratio), whether there is a listing in the
B-share or H-share market at the same time (HB_share) and
whether or not there is ownership by a parent company (Parent).
YEAR Year Year dummy variables
IND Industry Industry dummy variables
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X
bnControlvariablesi;t þ ei;t ð1Þ
TCi;t ¼ b0 þ b1C-Scorei;t1 þ b2MPi;t þ b3MPi;t  C-Scorei;t1 þ
X
bnControlvariablesi;t þ ei;t ð2ÞIf H1 is supported, the coeﬃcient for C-Score, b1, should be signiﬁcantly positive. In addition, b3 should
also be signiﬁcantly positive if H2 is supported.4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for all of the variables. The mean of trade credit is 16.9% and the
median is 13.8%. The mean and median of C-Score are 0.043 and 0.030 respectively, implying that the sample
companies implemented conservative accounting policies during 2003–2012. The mean of monetary policy
(MP) is 48.1% and the standard deviation is 50%, showing that the observations are relatively uniform under
tight monetary policy and loose monetary policy. The maximum and minimum of SIZE are 25.33 and 19.41
respectively, and the maximum and minimum of EBIT are 0.232 and 0.275 respectively, which are
reasonable.
Table 3 gives the correlations between the variables. There is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between TC
and C-Score, showing that the higher an enterprise’s accounting conservatism, the more trade credit it obtains.
The relationship between TC and C-Score is consistent with our expectations. The correlations of TC with
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Std
TC 12,121 0.169 0.005 0.074 0.138 0.232 0.581 0.125
C-Score 12,121 0.043 0.114 0.002 0.030 0.078 0.286 0.077
MP 12,121 0.481 0 0 0 1 1 0.500
MPOWER 12,121 0.555 0 0 1 1 1 0.497
STATE 12,121 0.652 0 0 1 1 1 0.477
LOAN 12,121 0.218 0 0.091 0.211 0.324 0.641 0.154
AGE 12,121 2.808 1.099 2.639 2.833 2.996 3.555 0.273
SIZE 12,121 21.70 19.41 20.89 21.57 22.33 25.33 1.145
CFO 12,121 0.050 0.201 0.007 0.049 0.094 0.265 0.079
LIQ 12,121 0.526 0.081 0.368 0.533 0.684 0.956 0.211
EBIT 12,121 0.051 0.275 0.028 0.051 0.080 0.232 0.069
GROWTH 12,121 0.196 0.671 0.007 0.140 0.313 2.726 0.433
GOVINDEX 12,121 0.222 2.309 1.012 0.375 0.357 4.637 1.219
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position or state ownership obtain more trade credit. The relationship between LOAN and TC is signiﬁcantly
negative, implying that if an enterprise can obtain more loans from banks, it will reduce its demand for trade
credit, thus conﬁrming ﬁnancing substitution theory.
4.2. Regression analysis
4.2.1. Accounting conservatism and trade credit
First, we investigate the eﬀect of accounting conservatism on trade credit, with the results of the regression
analysis provided in Table 4.
In regression (1), we use TCt, i.e. (accounts payable + notes payable + advances from customers)/total
assets, as the dependent variable. The coeﬃcient for C-Scoret1 is 0.379, which is signiﬁcantly positive at
the 1% level, suggesting that the higher the accounting conservatism, the more trade credit is obtained from
the supplier and the customer. High accounting conservatism can reduce the degree of information asymmetry
to more eﬀectively protect the interests of suppliers and customers, and help trading parties to establish
cooperative relations with mutual trust, such that the supplier and the customer are willing to accept a certain
degree of risk and provide more trade credit. Thus, hypothesis 1 is conﬁrmed.
The coeﬃcient for MPOWERt is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that enterprises with stronger market
positions can obtain more trade credit. The coeﬃcient for STATEt is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that
state-owned enterprises can obtain signiﬁcantly more trade credit than private enterprises. The relationship
between LOAN and TC is signiﬁcantly negative, showing that the more bank credit obtained, the less trade
credit obtained. There is a speciﬁc substitution relationship between bank credit and trade credit, in line with
the theory of ﬁnancing substitution.
4.2.2. Monetary policy, accounting conservatism and trade credit
We further investigate the eﬀect of accounting conservatism on trade credit in the context of monetary
policy changes. The results of this regression analysis after adding MPt  C-Scoret1 to the model are
provided in Table 4.
The results of regression (2) show that C-Scoret1 is still signiﬁcantly positive and MPt  C-Scoret1 is too,
indicating that accounting conservatism is more important under tight monetary policy. In a period of
monetary tightening, trade credit becomes a type of scarce resource. Thus, suppliers or customers become
more cautious about providing trade credit due to increasing uncertainty in the economic environment. In this
situation, an enterprise with a higher level of accounting conservatism has more advantages in terms of
obtaining trade credit provided by suppliers or customers. That is, relative to a period of monetary easing,
suppliers and customers are more willing to provide trade credit to enterprises with higher accounting
conservatism in a period of monetary tightening. Thus, hypothesis 2 is conﬁrmed.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
TC C-Score MP MPOWER STATE LOAN AGE SIZE CFO LIQ EBIT GROWTH GOVINDEX
TC 0.129*** 0 0.276*** 0.030*** 0.133*** 0.026*** 0.159*** 0.038*** 0.451*** 0.074*** 0.112*** 0.031***
C-Score 0.133*** 0.206*** 0.030*** 0 0.264*** 0.127*** 0.128*** 0.081*** 0.048*** 0.170*** 0.037*** 0.028***
MP 0 0.160*** 0.008 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.036*** 0.021** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.073*** 0.014
MPOWER 0.264*** 0.054*** 0.008 0.182*** 0.071*** 0.001 0.641*** 0.110*** 0.041*** 0.198*** 0.182*** 0.218***
STATE 0.045*** 0.012 0.033*** 0.182*** 0.036*** 0.075*** 0.219*** 0.049*** 0.170*** 0.052*** 0.041*** 0.732***
LOAN 0.195*** 0.277*** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.035*** 0.124*** 0.142*** 0.189*** 0.265*** 0.237*** 0 0.032***
AGE 0.004 0.146*** 0.074*** 0.027*** 0.117*** 0.149*** 0.003 0.031*** 0.072*** 0.106*** 0.075*** 0.041***
SIZE 0.168*** 0.157*** 0.043*** 0.596*** 0.226*** 0.123*** 0.027*** 0.055*** 0.079*** 0.176*** 0.140*** 0.260***
CFO 0.003 0.078*** 0.023** 0.099*** 0.054*** 0.204*** 0.029*** 0.050*** 0.232*** 0.407*** 0.119*** 0.041***
LIQ 0.462*** 0.054*** 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.174*** 0.264*** 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.224*** 0.007 0.045*** 0.137***
EBIT 0.051*** 0.207*** 0.021** 0.197*** 0.016* 0.296*** 0.112*** 0.189*** 0.376*** 0.029*** 0.327*** 0.037***
GROWTH 0.094*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.136*** 0.008 0.009 0.027*** 0.113*** 0.083*** 0.063*** 0.263*** 0.035***
GOVINDEX 0.033*** 0.005 0.036*** 0.203*** 0.671*** 0.067*** 0.221*** 0.236*** 0.043*** 0.152*** 0.029*** 0.012
Spearman correlations are provided in the upper right of the table and Pearson correlations to the lower left.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 4
Monetary policy, accounting conservatism and trade credit.
Variables TCt TCt
(1) (2)
C-Scoret1 0.379
*** 0.178***
(17.97) (10.71)
MPt  C-Scoret1 0.162***
(8.56)
MPt 0.007***
(5.09)
MPOWERt 0.047
*** 0.043***
(10.79) (10.00)
STATEt 0.013
*** 0.012**
(2.60) (2.46)
LOANt 0.167*** 0.156***
(11.91) (11.38)
AGE 0.009 0.008
(1.29) (1.15)
SIZEt 0.018
*** 0.019***
(7.16) (8.73)
CFOt 0.162
*** 0.160***
(9.46) (9.29)
LIQt 0.250
*** 0.256***
(22.15) (22.24)
EBITt 0.392*** 0.373***
(15.66) (14.88)
GROWTHt 0.023
*** 0.024***
(9.50) (10.08)
GOVINDEXt 0.001 0.000
(0.52) (0.16)
Year Yes No
Industry Yes Yes
Cluster at ﬁrm level Yes Yes
N 12,121 12,121
Adj. R2 0.449 0.432
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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5.1. Diﬀerent company types: according to ownership and market position
Based on the alternative ﬁnancing theory, companies that cannot obtain bank loans have to turn to trade
credit, which mainly occurs for private enterprises in China. The existing research shows that China’s banks
exhibit clear ‘‘credit discrimination” against enterprises on the basis of ownership, with state-owned
B. Dai, F. Yang / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 295–313 305enterprises enjoying more preferential credit policies (Lu et al., 2009; Jiang and Li, 2006). Even setting ‘‘own-
ership discrimination” aside, ﬁnancial institutions demand higher interest rates or impose stiﬀer conditions for
small and medium enterprises, and may even refuse to provide loans to avoid adverse selection and moral haz-
ard, because the ﬁnancial institutions are unable to fully appreciate the true situation of these enterprises. A
survey suggests that guarantees, mortgages, ﬁnancial transparency, corporate operating performance and
other practical problems continue to restrict the ﬁnancing of small businesses (Research Group of Center
for Chinese Banking Studies in Central University of Finance and Economics, 2007). This prompts private
enterprises to turn to suppliers or customers. Suppliers are willing to provide trade credit because they can
detect changes in a company’s operation and credit situation in a timely fashion, and are able to encourage
the company to abide by a contract through taking control of raw materials. However, in this case the cost
of trade credit is generally high, most likely because the supplier requires the company to pay an insurance
premium and a default premium to alleviate risk (Cunat, 2007). Thus, relative to state-owned enterprises,
improving accounting conservatism may help a private enterprise to obtain trade credit.
Based on the market power theory, a company with a stronger market position will encourage suppliers or
customers to take the initiative to provide trade credit, to promote sales or obtain supplies. However, suppliers
or customers have no control over the company’s products or channels due to the company’s buyer market
power over suppliers and seller market power over customers. In addition, individual suppliers or customers
are unable to detect changes in the company’s operating conditions because the individual business volumes
are too small. Therefore, suppliers and customers take advantage of accounting conservatism to provide pro-
tection for a trade credit contract. For a company with a strong market position, therefore, higher accounting
conservatism provides greater beneﬁts for suppliers and customers and makes more trade credit available to
the company.
The overall sample is divided into four according to ownership and market position: state-owned enter-
prises with a weak market position, private enterprises with a weak market position, state-owned enterprises
with a strong market position, and private enterprises with a strong market position. Using state-owned enter-
prises with a weak market position as the benchmark, the importance of accounting conservatism for diﬀerent
ownership and market position is examined.
In Table 5, COMPANYMPOWERt=0,STATEt=0 represents private enterprises with a weak market position,
COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt=1 represents state-owned enterprises with a strong market position and
COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt=0 represents private enterprises with a strong market position. The coeﬃcient
for C-Scoret1 indicates the eﬀect of accounting conservatism on trade credit for state-owned enterprises with
a weak market position. The coeﬃcients for the three interactions with C-Scoret1 indicate, relative to state-
owned enterprises with a weak market position, the incremental eﬀects of accounting conservatism on trade
credit for the other three company types.
The results show that the coeﬃcient for C-Scoret1 is signiﬁcantly positive, as are the coeﬃcients for
COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt =1  C-Scoret1 and COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt=0  C-Scoret1, in a
period of monetary easing. Conversely, in a period of monetary tightening, only the coeﬃcients for
C-Scoret1 and COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt=0  C-Scoret1 are signiﬁcantly positive. This shows that even
for state-owned enterprises with a weak market position, accounting conservatism is also signiﬁcantly positive
with respect to trade credit, and this positive correlation is particularly signiﬁcant for private enterprises with a
strong market position, especially under tight monetary policy.
5.2. Relationship between trading parties: related party vs. non-related party
In both alternative ﬁnancing theory and market power theory, it is implicitly assumed that an independent
relationship exists between a company and its suppliers or customers. Therefore, when suppliers or customers
provide trade credit to the company, they will consider the company’s size, proﬁtability, development pro-
spects, ownership type, accounting information quality and so on, to ensure the protection of their interests.
In practice, the company may have an associated relationship with the counterparty. A supplier may be the
company’s parent company or subsidiary, or be controlled by the same parent company. Given the existence
of such a relationship, the trading parties may have diﬀerent motives when providing trade credit to
the company.
Table 5
Monetary policy, accounting conservatism and trade credit: diﬀerent company types.
Variables TCt TCt TCt
Full sample Under loose monetary policy Under tight monetary policy
(1) (2) (3)
C-Scoret1 0.325
*** 0.281*** 0.411***
(10.67) (8.46) (9.28)
COMPANYMPOWERt=0,STATEt=0  C-Scoret1 0.010 0.026 0.009
(0.27) (0.62) (0.17)
COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt=1  C-Scoret1 0.106*** 0.120*** 0.080
(2.85) (2.91) (1.59)
COMPANYMPOWERt=1,STATEt=0  C-Scoret1 0.175*** 0.170*** 0.148**
(3.31) (2.70) (2.05)
MPOWERt 0.041
*** 0.040*** 0.043***
(9.13) (8.56) (8.43)
STATEt 0.014
*** 0.015*** 0.012**
(2.69) (2.90) (2.08)
LOANt 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.178***
(11.93) (11.34) (11.16)
AGEt 0.009 0.014
** 0.001
(1.35) (2.20) (0.12)
SIZEt 0.018
*** 0.019*** 0.017***
(7.26) (7.54) (6.20)
CFOt 0.163
*** 0.185*** 0.141***
(9.53) (8.42) (6.18)
LIQt 0.249
*** 0.245*** 0.251***
(22.16) (21.60) (20.06)
EBITt 0.395*** 0.413*** 0.376***
(15.85) (14.06) (12.52)
GROWTHt 0.023
*** 0.022*** 0.024***
(9.48) (6.58) (7.00)
GOVINDEXt 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.54) (0.73) (0.02)
Year Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
Cluster at ﬁrm level Yes Yes Yes
N 12,121 6286 5835
Adj. R2 0.451 0.448 0.456
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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relationship, and that this type of relational trust may aﬀect the choice of trade credit mode. Hong and Fang
(2005) and Tong and Cheng (2007) also hold that the controlling shareholder of a listed corporation may exhi-
bit supportive or tunneling behavior depending on the circumstances. By making supportive decisions, con-
trolling shareholders can improve the stability of the company’s earnings and thus improve the value of the
B. Dai, F. Yang / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 295–313 307company. Therefore, based on a trust relationship, suppliers or customers may place less value on accounting
conservatism and other operating features when providing trade credit. They may even oﬀer trade credit
to the company for supportive purposes, such as to help the company get through a period of ﬁnancial
strain.
Hence, we examine the eﬀect of related transactions on the acquisition of trade credit. From the full sample
we identify 7460 ﬁrm-year observations involved in related transactions, and divide trade credit into
controlling shareholder trade credit, other related party trade credit and non-related party trade credit.3
Descriptive statistics show that the mean of overall trade credit is 18.4%, and the means of non-related party
trade credit and related party trade credit are 17.1% and 1.3%, respectively. For related party trade credit,
trade credit obtained from controlling shareholders and from other related parties averages 0.2% and 0.9%,
respectively. With respect to scale, the amount of related party trade credit is far less than that of non-
related party trade credit, and the amount of controlling shareholder trade credit is also lower than that of
other related party trade credit.
Through regression analysis, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results for controlling shareholder trade credit,
related party trade credit and non-related party trade credit. In Table 6, the results are similar to Table 4 when
non-related party trade credit is used as the dependent variable. The coeﬃcients for C-Scoret1 and
MPt  C-Scoret1 are signiﬁcantly positive, while that for MPt is negative. These results indicate that the
higher the accounting conservatism, the more trade credit is available from non-related parties, and this is
especially signiﬁcant in a period of monetary tightening. When related party trade credit is used as the depen-
dent variable, the coeﬃcient for C-Scoret1 is still signiﬁcantly positive while those for MPt  C-Scoret1 and
MPt are not signiﬁcant, indicating that although accounting conservatism has an eﬀect on the trade credit
available from other related parties, this eﬀect is not pronounced in a period of monetary tightening. When
controlling shareholder trade credit is used as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcients for C-Scoret1 and MPt -
 C-Scoret1 are not signiﬁcant and that for MPt is signiﬁcantly positive at the 10% level. These results show
that controlling shareholders do not focus on accounting conservatism, and even enhance their support of the
company by loosening their credit policy during periods of monetary tightening.
5.3. Sensitivity testing
5.3.1. Endogeneity problem
In Hui et al. (2012), the bargaining power of an enterprise with respect to a supplier decides the level of
accounting conservatism, but our results show that accounting conservatism inﬂuences trade credit provided
by the supplier. This ﬁnding may indicate that there is a bi-directional association between accounting conser-
vatism and trade credit, namely that accounting conservatism may be related to the residual term. As a com-
pany’s accounting conservatism may remain stable over a period, merely lagging accounting conservatism
may not solve the problem completely. To control for this endogeneity problem relating to accounting con-
servatism in H1, a company’s short-term debt-paying ability (CR) is used as an instrumental variable to carry
out two-stage least-squares regression and the results continue to support H1.
The instrumental variable is selected according to Petersen and Rajan (1997). They hold that when a sup-
plier provides business credit, the main consideration is the actual operating conditions and the capacity for
long-term development, and current solvency is not especially important. However, if company debt ratios
greatly increase, banks will require companies to adopt more prudent accounting policies to protect the banks’
own interests (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007). Therefore, we use short-term solvency as an instrumental variable,
and carry out the under-identiﬁcation test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) and the weak-identiﬁcation
test (Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic). The results show that the instrumental variable is correlated with the
endogenous variable.3 According to the CSMAR related transaction database, other related parties that provide trade credit in the A-share market are mainly
other enterprises controlled by the same parent company as the listed company (accounting for 62% of the total), associated enterprises of
the listed company (4%), joint ventures of the listed company (2%) and investors who can exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the listed
company (2%).
Table 6
Monetary policy, accounting conservatism and trade credit: related party transactions.
Variables TCt (controlling shareholder trade
credit)
TCt (other related-party trade
credit)
TCt (non-related party trade
credit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C-Scoret1 0.002 0.003 0.020
*** 0.016*** 0.377*** 0.182***
(0.88) (1.51) (4.23) (3.54) (15.08) (8.97)
MPt  C-Scoret1 0.003 0.003 0.176***
(1.10) (0.54) (7.27)
MPt 0.000
* 0.000 0.008***
(1.88) (0.95) (4.83)
MPOWERt 0.000 0.000 0.003
*** 0.003*** 0.040*** 0.037***
(0.02) (0.35) (2.95) (3.14) (7.54) (7.15)
STATEt 0.001
** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.012** 0.012*
(2.31) (2.41) (0.15) (0.24) (1.96) (1.96)
LOANt 0.002** 0.002** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.169*** 0.157***
(2.30) (2.09) (4.63) (4.34) (10.05) (9.49)
AGE 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003** 0.007 0.006
(1.41) (1.09) (2.02) (2.24) (0.80) (0.71)
SIZEt 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.016
*** 0.017***
(1.37) (0.92) (1.23) (1.06) (5.46) (6.54)
CFOt 0.001 0.001 0.010
** 0.010** 0.128*** 0.122***
(0.38) (0.68) (2.20) (2.27) (6.15) (5.82)
LIQt 0.001 0.001 0.009
*** 0.010*** 0.266*** 0.272***
(0.86) (0.82) (3.75) (3.82) (19.01) (19.10)
EBITt 0.003 0.003* 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.404*** 0.385***
(1.52) (1.74) (6.81) (6.72) (13.75) (13.10)
GROWTHt 0.001
** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.022*** 0.024***
(2.21) (2.37) (1.34) (1.59) (7.09) (7.72)
GOVINDEXt 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002 0.003
(4.82) (4.96) (3.01) (3.01) (0.89) (1.42)
Year Yes No Yes No Yes No
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster at ﬁrm level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,460 7,460 7,460 7,460 7,460 7,460
Adj. R2 0.037 0.036 0.052 0.050 0.468 0.454
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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To avoid industry factors aﬀecting the results, the industry mean is subtracted from each company’s trade
credit in a sensitivity test, with the results provided in Table 7. The coeﬃcient for C-Scoret1 is still signiﬁ-
cantly positive and that for MPt  C-Scoret1 is also positive, which supports the hypotheses.
Although accounting conservatism is an annual variable, trade credit may include accounts payable and
advances from customers from previous years. Therefore, in a sensitivity test, the sum of accounts payable,
notes payable and advances from customers within a year is used to represent trade credit, standardized by
Table 7
Alternative variables for trade credit: adjusted by industry mean or within one year.
Variables TC (trade credit
adjusted by industry mean)
TC (trade credit
adjusted by industry mean)
TC (trade credit
within one year)
TC (trade credit
within one year)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C-Scoret1 0.375
*** 0.205*** 0.186*** 0.049***
(18.07) (12.54) (8.58) (2.62)
MPt  C-Scoret1 0.090*** 0.081***
(4.84) (3.35)
MPt 0.006*** 0.003
(4.31) (1.46)
MPOWERt 0.049
*** 0.047*** 0.028*** 0.025***
(11.46) (11.26) (6.36) (5.79)
STATEt 0.013
** 0.013** 0.019*** 0.020***
(2.57) (2.56) (3.95) (3.95)
LOANt 0.166*** 0.148*** 0.128*** 0.120***
(12.00) (11.07) (10.26) (9.96)
AGE 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.003
(1.08) (1.43) (0.76) (0.57)
SIZEt 0.016
*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.013***
(6.70) (7.09) (4.12) (5.39)
CFOt 0.157
*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.155***
(9.24) (9.02) (8.44) (8.22)
LIQt 0.244
*** 0.251*** 0.146*** 0.150***
(22.05) (22.28) (13.56) (13.76)
EBITt 0.383*** 0.374*** 0.191*** 0.170***
(15.56) (15.15) (7.97) (7.10)
GROWTHt 0.022
*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(8.92) (10.07) (4.20) (4.48)
GOVINDEXt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.39) (0.33) (0.48) (1.19)
Year Yes No Yes No
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster at ﬁrm level Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12,121 12,121 5392 5392
Adj. R2 0.344 0.331 0.385 0.366
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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signiﬁcantly positive, which supports the hypotheses.5.3.3. Alternative variables for tight monetary policy
Since the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, the website of the People’s Bank of China has published a quarterly
‘‘national banker survey report” on systematic investigations carried out jointly by the People’s Bank of
China and the National Bureau of Statistics. About 3000 banking institutions are investigated through a
Table 8
Alternative variables for tight monetary policy: monetary policy tightness index..
Variables TC (original MPINDEX) TC (original MPINDEX) TC (dummy MPINDEX) TC (dummy MPINDEX)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
C-Scoret1 0.500
*** 0.209*** 0.500*** 0.271***
(18.73) (7.32) (18.73) (13.73)
MPt  C-Scoret1 0.387*** 0.070***
(4.25) (2.61)
MPt 0.052*** 0.004**
(8.84) (2.25)
MPOWERt 0.048
*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.044***
(9.80) (8.79) (9.80) (8.68)
STATEt 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
(0.94) (0.93) (0.94) (0.91)
LOANt 0.203*** 0.170*** 0.203*** 0.168***
(11.87) (10.30) (11.87) (10.13)
AGE 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.010
(0.97) (0.83) (0.97) (0.98)
SIZEt 0.022
*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022***
(7.44) (7.58) (7.44) (7.60)
CFOt 0.128
*** 0.124*** 0.128*** 0.131***
(6.29) (5.91) (6.29) (6.24)
LIQt 0.237
*** 0.249*** 0.237*** 0.252***
(18.92) (19.09) (18.92) (19.20)
EBITt 0.291*** 0.287*** 0.291*** 0.289***
(10.75) (10.41) (10.75) (10.48)
GROWTHt 0.023
*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(6.71) (7.25) (6.71) (6.85)
GOVINDEXt 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.03) (0.63) (0.03) (0.79)
Year Yes No Yes No
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster at ﬁrm level Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6743 6743 6743 6743
Adj. R2 0.472 0.447 0.472 0.444
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity and company clustering to obtain robust standard errors.
Adjusted t-statistics are provided in brackets.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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institutions at municipal level or above, while a stratiﬁed PPS sampling survey (proportional to the scale of
each credit cooperative) is used to investigate rural credit cooperatives. The respondents include directors
of headquarters and presidents and vice presidents in charge of credit at provincial and secondary-level branch
institutions in various banking institutions (including foreign commercial banks). The report gives the propor-
tion of investigated bankers who believe that current monetary policy is ‘‘loose,” ‘‘moderate” or ‘‘tight.”Here,
Table 9
Alternative variable for accounting conservatism: average C-Score.
Variables Coeﬃcient Adjusted t-statistic
MEAN_C-Score 0.954*** (15.53)
MEAN_MPOWER 0.059*** (10.17)
MEAN_STATE 0.021*** (4.48)
MEAN_LOAN 0.144*** (7.31)
MEAN_AGE 0.010** (2.14)
MEAN_SIZE 0.004 (1.43)
MEAN_CFO 0.194*** (3.12)
MEAN_LIQ 0.213*** (15.27)
MEAN_EBIT 0.361*** (5.18)
MEAN_GROWTH 0.000 (0.23)
MEAN_GOVINDEX 0.002 (1.48)
Industry Yes
N 2134
Adj. R2 0.501
Note: All of the coeﬃcient estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity to obtain
robust standard errors.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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based on monetary liquidity.4
For each year between 2004 and 2009, the monetary policy tightness index is 37.53%, 18.95%, 18.98%,
39.63%, 51.03% and 5.03%, respectively. Based on the original value of the monetary policy tightness index
(MPINDEX), we deﬁne 2004, 2007 and 2008 as years with tightening monetary policy and 2005, 2006 and
2009 as years with easing monetary policy, substituting a dummy variable into the regression equation.
The results are shown in Table 8. The coeﬃcients for C-Scoret1 and MPINDEXt  C-Scoret1 are signif-
icantly positive, conﬁrming the hypotheses.
5.3.4. Alternative variable for accounting conservatism
To avoid error in measuring accounting conservatism, we average the values for C-Score in 2003–2012 to
obtain an average conservatism index. To maintain unity, the average values of the other variables are also
calculated, giving data for 2134 companies. The results of the regression analysis using these values are shown
in Table 9. The coeﬃcient for MEAN_C-Score is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that H1 is still supported.
6. Conclusions
Using a sample of A-share listed ﬁrms in China during 2003–2012, we investigate the eﬀect of accounting
conservatism on trade credit, taking the eﬀect of monetary policy into account. The results show that corpo-
rations with higher accounting conservatism obtain more trade credit, and this relationship becomes more
positive under tight monetary policy.
After grouping the enterprises by market position and ownership type, the positive correlation between
accounting conservatism and trade credit is most signiﬁcant for a private company with a strong market posi-
tion. However, when the suppliers and customers are grouped according to transaction relationships, the pos-
itive correlation between accounting conservatism and trade credit is no longer signiﬁcant if the trading party
is a controlling shareholder.4 Between the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 and the third quarter of 2006, the report categorizes beliefs about current monetary policy into ‘‘too
loose,” ‘‘loose,” ‘‘moderate,” ‘‘tight” or ‘‘too tight.” It drops the ‘‘too tight” category from the fourth quarter of 2006, and reports beliefs
only as ‘‘moderate” since the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. Hence, a ‘‘tightness” index is used to measure the degree of monetary tightening, and the
sample window is narrowed to 2004–2009.
312 B. Dai, F. Yang / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 295–313The conclusions show that accounting conservatism can reduce the degree of information asymmetry, pro-
tect the interests of suppliers and customers more eﬀectively, and help both parties to contract to establish
cooperative relations with mutual trust, such that suppliers and customers are willing to accept a certain
degree of risk and provide more trade credit. These eﬀects are particularly signiﬁcant in private enterprises
with a strong market position.
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